Safeguard B Detail

Content with Safeguard B B1.2 times .


In Vietnamese law, accountability can be understood as “the provision of information by state agencies about the performance of their assigned duties and powers and responsibilities”[1]. More broadly, accountability relates to the transparency of the activities of public agencies, organisations and units, with the aim of ensuring a democratic approach to state management, recognising that society has a supervisory role to play[2]. Viet Nam has created dedicated institutions with competence for promoting transparency of the forest sector activities, which include supervision and monitoring of funds. Furthermore, forest budgets are to be scrutinised by a parliamentary and governmental process, and information about the forest agencies budget should be made publicly available. Accountability is also linked to the adoption and implementation of policies, laws and regulations to tackle corruption and possible misuse of funds.

The Anti-Corruption Law (2018) and define corruption and corrupt acts, mandate the development of codes of conduct for public servants and place an obligation on public officials of a certain rank to declare their assets (article 34), and state that all public servants are expected to report acts of corruption where witnessed (article 66)[3]. In addition, assets and income shall be declared including land use rights (article 35). . According to article 5, every citizen, by law, has the right to discover and report acts of corruption, the right to protection and rewards; the right to propose amendments to anti-corruption laws and supervise implementation of thereof. The receiving authority shall promptly process the information and implement measures for protecting the informers. Complaints against corrupt activities shall be received and handled in accordance with the regulations of the law on denunciation. Information about corrupt activities shall be received and handled in accordance with regulations of law on administrative procedures (article 65). Government agencies have the duty to prepare annual reports on anti-corruption works (article 84).

Vietnamese Fatherland Front and its member organizations are entitled to request other competent authorities to implement anti-corruption measures, investigate corruption cases and take actions against corrupted individuals, recover corruptly-acquired assets, propose rewards for anti-corruption informers (article 74).

The Central Steering Committee against Corruption has national responsibility for directing, coordinating, inspecting and promoting anti-corruption efforts. The National Assembly and its Standing Committee supervise anti-corruption efforts in the domains that fall within their jurisdiction. People’s inspection boards at all levels supervise anti-corruption efforts in their respective localities. Citizens, on their own initiative or through the people’s inspectorates, public investment supervision board or their organizations to which they are members, shall participate in anticorruption activities.

Government Inspectorate, ministerial inspectorates and provincial inspectorates, within the scope of their duties and entitlements, shall inspect implementation of anti-corruption laws (article 80).

Where such observation reveals corrupt acts, the receiving authority shall verify information, take appropriate actions and inform the result to the requesting entity. 

According to article 61, the Government shall submit an annual report on management of denunciation settlement to the National Assembly, Standing Committee of National Assembly and the President, and notify the management of denunciation settlement to the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. Ministries, ministerial agencies, Governmental agencies and People’s Committees of provinces shall submit reports on management of their denunciation settlement to the Government on a periodic basis or upon request. People’s Committees shall submit an annual report on management of denunciation settlement to People’s Councils at the same level and supervisory authorities, and notify the management of denunciation settlement to the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front.

There are a number of bodies responsible for coordinating, inspecting, and promoting anti-corruption efforts at different levels, as detailed in SOI, including Central and Provincial Steering Committee against Corruption; National Assembly and its Standing Committee; People‘s inspection boards at all levels; Government Inspectorate, ministerial inspectorate, provincial inspectorates, provincial Services' inspectorates, district inspectorates. The State Audit is responsible for organizing the audit functions both to prevent and to detect corrupt activities in government operations. The Supreme People‘s Procuracy is mandated to organize and direct the prosecution of corruption-related crimes. Provincial Peoples Committees are responsible to deal with denunciations/complaints[4].).

 

[1] Government Decree No. 90/2013/ND-CP, Article 3(1).

[2] Nguyen Tuan Khanh ‘Improving the legal bases for accountability’, http://noichinh.vn/nghien-cuu-trao-doi/201309/hoan-thien-co-so-phap-ly-ve-trach-nhiem-giai-trinh-292197/, 18 November 2013

[3] The anti-corruption Law (2018). Available at https://www.economica.vn/Content/files/LAW%20%26%20REG/Law%20on%20Anti-Corruption%202018.pdf

[4] Viet Nam first Summary of Information (2018). Available at https://redd.unfccc.int/files/4850_1_first_soi_viet_nam__28eng_29.pdf


A number of risks related to accountability and corruption control have been identified through REDD+ planning processes at the national and subnational levels. A 2017 assessment of potential benefits and risks arising from National REDD+ Programme[1] policies and measures identified risks in this area focused on the potential for 'elite capture' of REDD+ processes and/or benefits. For example, such risks may include:

  • A lack of transparency and manipulation of consultations processes for environmental impact assessment/strategic environmental assessments;
  • Financial mechanisms (such as business incubators) may better serve the interests of the private sector at the expense of smallholders; and
  • Elite capture of business models and associated benefits for managing and conserving natural forests.

The assessment at the national level also put forward a number of suggested measures for addressing the identified risks related to accountability/corruption control, especially elite capture, including:

  • Ensure inclusive, participatory and transparent consultation processes, with clear guidelines covering selection of representatives, inclusiveness, information sharing/disclosure, consent processes, and so on.
  • Develop clear policies, principles, standard operating procedures and guidelines for financial mechanisms  and business models, in order to enhance social co-benefits and address social risks; attention should focus on developing and operationalising safeguards to protect rural communities and smallholders involved in producing key commodities.
  • Clarify and implement forest land allocation procedures to address issues of inequity and inequality, and to enhance positive social impacts. There should be capacity-building for public sector implementation agencies (e.g. Forest Management Boards, extension agencies) on safeguards measures and procedures.

In addition, Grievance Redress Mechanisms (GRMs) relevant to REDD+ in Viet Nam are expected to address complaints and disputes related to issues of accountability, corruption and elite capture (see Safeguard B2). The processes in place to ensure the transparency and fairness of benefit sharing are also covered under Safeguard B2.

At the sub-national level, analysis of social and environmental risks and benefits was required for the development of Provincial REDD+ Action Plans (PRAPs)[2]. In specific sub-national locations, assessments have also been carried out through the Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA) during the development of the FCPF Emission Reductions Program (ER Program)  in the North-Central Region of Viet Nam, and through the assessment of Environmental and Social Considerations for the Project for Sustainable Forest Management in the Northwest Watershed Area (SUSFORM-NOW) funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).The ER Program’s SESA and ESMF, for example, identifies a number of risks related to 'elite capture', for example of REDD+ benefits and access to forest resources[3].

 

[1] NRAP 2017, Decision No 419/QD-TTg dated 5/4/2017.

[2] Chapter 3, MARD Decision No. 5414/2015/QD-BNN-TCLN.

[3] Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund. Emission Reductions Program Document (ER-PD). Date of Submission: 5 January 2018